Executive Summary
During the latter half of the 1980s and throughout much of the 1990s, budget constraints were increasingly tight, resulting in Defense budget reductions (measured in constant dollars) that commenced in FY 1986 and extended through FY 1997-the only increase being FY 1991, corresponding to Operation Desert Storm. In an attempt to squeeze every penny from required resources, DoD leadership emphasized the necessity of controlling cost of new warfighting systems-not only the cost of development and production, but also the cost of sustainment. In 1995, Dr. Paul Kaminski, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD (A&T)), introduced the term "Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV)" in recognition that resources were tight and that weapon system costs-lifecycle costs-would have to be managed and controlled through tradeoffs that occur during the developmental process.
As one who is familiar with policy change in the DoD might expect, decisive change did not result immediately. Nevertheless, a group of Pilot programs were identified within each DoD Component that would provide lessons for Reduction in Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC).
Furthermore, a relevant series of OSD and CJCS regulatory changes were published in 2003 and 2004 which were intended to support CAIV and contribute to R-TOC. It now seems time to gauge emerging changes. This research effort proceeds by seeking answers to the following questions.
• Has the DoD put into place policy and implemented guidance to support the practice CAIV in the acquisition of the DoD's warfighting systems?
• Has the DoD established the necessary processes and tools to monitor and control CAIV?
• Has the DoD leadership exhibited the resolve to control Total Ownership Costs (TOC) of its warfighting systems?
• In the meantime, has the focus on CAIV and Reduction in Total Ownership
Cost somehow changed?
Using data available from a variety of DoD sources and interviews with expert DoD personnel, this paper highlights changes in policy, process, and practice aimed at reducing system lifecycle cost. The paper will point out new or remaining obstacles to the application of Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) and Reduction in Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC). The focus of this paper is the "front end" of the process-that is: during Concept Refinement, Technology Development, associated Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) reviews, and acquisition Milestones A & B.
A. Has the DoD put into place policy and implementing guidance, to practice CAIV in the acquisition of DoD's warfighting systems?
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD In combination, these directives, together with the online Guidebook, address the requirement for affordability assessments (in terms of modernization funding, i.e., RDT&E and procurement, and manpower) and consideration of total ownership cost (TOC) or system lifecycle cost (LCC) during Concept Refinement, Technology Development. Lifecycle cost is related to such activities as preparing the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD); conducting the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA); writing the
Capability Development Document (CDD); and progressing through JCIDS/JROC reviews, the Concept Decision, and Milestones A & B. Collectively, these regulations influence the work of sponsors, users, developers, staff overseers, leaders, and decision-makers.
Although there are numerous references and requirements focused on cost, neither the DoD 5000 series nor the CJSC 3170 series require that lifecycle cost targets or lifecycle cost key performance parameters must be established for newly emerging systems.
B. Has the DoD established the processes and tools to monitor and control CAIV?
The R-TOC Pilots-The R-TOC Pilot programs have yielded numerous processes that are useful to control lifecycle cost. Many lessons have been reported from this effort, which began in October 1999. Additionally, the need for improved cost databases and cost estimating tools has resulted in initiatives in each of the DoD Components and with defense contractors. Unfortunately, the R-TOC pilots currently do not include any programs that are early in their developmental cycle: that is, prior to Milestone B. There are obvious, prominent choices that could be selected as CAIV pilot programs in each of the DoD Components that might yield valuable lessons-learned for the acquisition community. Without designated CAIV pilot programs, the DoD may fail to capture these important lessons. This could leave unresolved whether or not current directives and processes are sufficient to guide the pre-acquisition and early development of new warfighting systems.
C. Has the DoD leadership exhibited the resolve to control Total Ownership Costs of its warfighting systems?
In general, there is considerable pressure on programs to prepare early cost information. In some instances, the pressure has been intensified through the use of Key Performance Parameters (KPP) written by the sponsors or users into requirements (ORD) or capability documents (CDD). Additionally, there is indication of at least one program specifying early cost targets in its acquisition strategy document.
JROC emphasis on TOC-The JROC has the latitude to question cost or affordability, but the role of the JROC is reportedly more focused on other issues (such as interoperability and joint use) than on cost. The JROC's lack of emphasis on affordability seems to be an opportunity lost; users might be more strongly encouraged to take an active interest in setting ownership cost targets.
Milestone Decision Authority emphasis on Cost-For various reasons,
acquisition milestone decision points may offer a better opportunity than the JROC process to address and influence warfighting system lifecycle cost. Much of the pressure on cost comes from mandatory independent cost estimates (ICE) that precede milestone reviews.
DoD Component leaders (within and outside acquisition) seem reluctant to
demand lifecycle cost targets prior to system development, possibly out of concern that incorrectly specified cost targets could increase program risk from "outside." No doubt, such an error in estimated cost could result in unfavorable attention to a critically needed warfighting system, and might even lead to its termination. DoD Component leaders also may lack confidence in lifecycle cost estimates until systems have been sufficiently tested and are poised for production and fielding.
There is a balance that needs careful handling. The earlier developers can set realistic cost targets, the better the cost control-earlier is better. On the other hand, poorly chosen cost targets might provide a program obstacle that delays or even topples the program. in Iraq, illustrates the point. A likely outcome of up-armoring vehicles, albeit one that seems to attract little notice, is the significant wear and tear on other vehicle components, which will directly result in increased system lifecycle cost.
D. In the meantime, has the focus on CAIV and Reduction in Total
Other Changes in Focus-Two other major acquisition initiatives may increase pressure on TOC and possibly compete against CAIV during the "front-end" analysis of an emerging warfighting system. The first is spiral development, which almost assuredly adds to logistics burden (that is, O&S cost). The other is the possibility of errors in analysis during the Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) determinationresulting in outsourced logistics that are virtually locked-in, but which, in certain scenarios, may become more expensive than alternative approaches. Both spiral development and PBL have potential effects on TOC that need further study.
Fact-of-Life Growth in Post Deployment Software Support (PDSS)-
Although this may not be a change in focus, essential change has gradually shaded the picture of system lifecycle cost. That is, the miracles wrought by software do not come without an increase in logistics cost. PDSS costs are expensive and must be 
I. Background
During the latter half of the 1980s and throughout much of the 1990s, budget constraints were increasingly tight, resulting in Defense budget reductions (measured in constant dollars) that commenced in FY 1986 and extended through FY 1997-the only increase being FY 1991, corresponding to Operation Desert Storm. 1 In an attempt to squeeze every penny from required resources, DoD leaders emphasized the necessity of controlling cost of new warfighting systems-not only the cost of development and production, but also the cost of sustainment. In 1995, Dr. Paul Kaminski, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD (A&T)), introduced the term "Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV)" in recognition that resources were tight and that weapon system costs-lifecycle costs-would have to be managed and controlled through tradeoffs that occur during the developmental process. 2 Over several years, the United States General Accounting Office (now renamed the Government Accountability Office (GAO)) reported private sector best practices for controlling costs and pointedly compared DoD acquisitions against private-sector best practices. In response to GAO suggestions for improvement, the DoD said the 
II. Scope
The scope of this research effort is, first, to review OSD directives, identify specific CAIV guidance, and weigh whether that guidance is up to the task of implementing CAIV in the development of warfighting systems.
Second, this research will include interviews of knowledgeable personnel who might offer insights into programs that have recently completed their Milestone B
Decision Points. It is worth examining whether leadership pressure is being brought to bear in reducing ownership cost around this point of development, because the period when warfighting systems are in pre-acquisition, progressing through various reviews, 3 Modified from schematic use in Naval Postgraduate School course MN3331, Principles of Acquisition and Program Management. This paper will focus on the "front end" of TOC, and will address CAIV primarily.
CAIV should begin to take shape during pre-acquisition-that is, during the Concept Refinement and Technology Development phases, when the user and/or sponsor are shaping the direction of the future program. During this period, much attention is aimed at stating required capabilities, which the eventual warfighting system must deliver.
Decisions made during the pre-acquisition phases will determine much of the eventual system costs, including operating and support costs, most of which will not actually be 
Expert Interviews
Published guidance and useable tools may be found to a large extent, as Addressing pre-acquisition activity, this document directs that multiple approaches be examined with robust analysis that considers affordability along with technology maturity and responsiveness. 8 In a later paragraph, it mandates that the user and developer = =^Å èìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = -14-k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= must agree that the solution is affordable. 9 This document establishes that an affordable increment of militarily useful capability must be identified as a condition for exiting the Technology Development phase. 10 Finally, it stipulates that cost be addressed in the Capability Development Document, using lifecycle cost or TOC, if available. 11 Mandatory program documentation includes an Affordability Assessment at both Milestone B and Milestone C. 12 The various references to cost and affordability do not require that lifecycle cost targets be established during pre-acquisition. It would seem prudent to amend DoD 5000.2 to require establishment of LCC targets at the system level and encourage establishment of LCC targets down to sub-system and component levels. the Defense Acquisition Guidebook are extracted and shown below. As informative as this approach is, the depictions in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook focus very pointedly on modernization funding and manpower requirements; 14 the Guidebook approach does not include other O&S costs (beyond the manpower portion). Affordability assessment (as described in the Guidebook) fails to show the increasing effects of the operating and support portion of lifecycle cost; these increases occur particularly as sustainment costs build up due to the increasing quantities of warfighting systems entering service and as the fielded systems age and begin to require more costly support. It is heartening that supportability and manpower assume default consideration as KPP, as both of these aspects directly and significantly contribute to lifecycle cost.
B. Has the DoD established the processes and tools to monitor and control CAIV?
The R-TOC Pilots-Each DoD Component-Army, Navy (including the Marine Corps), and the Air Force-identified ten R-TOC Pilots in 1999 and have updated them when necessary, since that time. However, the current list of R-TOC pilots does not include any programs early in their developmental cycle (i.e., prior to Milestone B).
There are obvious, prominent choices that could be selected as CAIV pilot programs in each of the DoD Components that might yield valuable lessons-learned for the acquisition community. However, for unknown reasons, none has been designated; this absence is quite troubling, because it is well understood across the DoD (and, indeed, outside the DoD) that early design decisions are likely to have the greatest potential influence on lifecycle cost. 23 There may be justifiable rationale for not selecting any of the current systems in pre-acquisition to be an R-TOC pilot; however, without including R-TOC pilots that are at or approaching their Milestone B decision point, the community of users and developers may miss valuable learning opportunities pertinent to the critical period when decisions are made that could potentially have the greatest effect on TOC. This is both a leadership and a learning issue. It is a leadership issue if programs are not aggressively pursuing cost reduction during pre-acquisition; it is a learning issue if the DoD is not documenting different approaches for setting and refining lifecycle cost targets and managing in accordance with those targets. breakdown in cost control. This could be due to different reasons, such as insufficient cost data, a lack of confidence in cost databases, or lack of commitment to control costs.
Specific demands for TOC Goals or Targets by the DoD Components-Interviews
Need for Clear, Accurate, Scrubbed Cost Data-One of the ways that analysts estimate the costs of a new warfighting system is to begin with the costs of earlier systems of a similar nature: that is, analogous systems. The "cleaner" the cost database of the predecessor system(s), the higher the confidence in cost estimates for the new system. However, there are many problems associated with collection of cost data. Cost databases are pulled together from many different sources. For example, in the Army's OSMIS database, fuel costs are pulled from one database and repair parts from another. OSMIS merges or draws from multiple databases. OSMIS peacetime information also is kept separate from wartime or contingency information.
In an effort to obtain clean, reliable field-usage data, the Army has used Sample Data Collection (SDC) in special circumstances such as the fielding of a new system. SDC is obtained by paid data collectors under contract and is likely to result in cleaner, more accurate data than is routinely provided by using units. Although SDC seems attractive, the presence of SDC personnel in military units is an irritant; SDC also is expensive. Additionally, loading sample data into the OSMIS database is problematic. System configuration differences (type, model, series) cause confusion in collecting data on warfighting systems, contributing to data errors at the time of field entry. Type, model, series errors can be scrubbed by a PM or contractor personnel, but such effort is time-consuming. An expected corollary benefit of performance-based logistics (PBL) is improved database accuracy, which likely would contribute to improved analogous cost estimates for successor systems.
Practitioners who were interviewed either stated directly or implied that cost of new technology was not credible without empirical data. This is similar to the assertion in one particular practitioner interview that cost analysts do not consider innovative developmental processes or practices to be credible in the absence of empirical cost = =^Å èìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = -22-k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= data. That is, innovative system or component designs or developmental processes are seen as risky until the costs are actually demonstrated. Of course, it might be argued that decision-makers should be slow to accept promises without confirmatory data.
C. Has the DoD leadership exhibited the resolve to control Total Ownership Costs of its warfighting systems?
Leadership Pressure to Reduce Total Ownership Cost (TOC)-Program office and other DoD personnel indicated during interviews that there is significant emphasis on control of cost. One respondent suggested that the emphasis on cost was most prevalent around a milestone decision point. Another offered that acquisition milestone decision process might be better suited to address ownership cost than the JCIDS/JROC process. Both of these observations are consistent with the mandatory independent cost estimates and other cost-related requirements at Milestone B (or Program Initiation for Ships in the case of Naval vessels).
JROC Emphasis on TOC-Three practitioners interviewed who were familiar
with the JCIDS process and JROC reviews indicated that the JCIDS principal focus was interoperability and performance, but none would say that cost was ignored during JROC/JCIDS reviews. This appears to be an opportunity missed because the JCIDS and JROC reviews could reinforce the need for user involvement in cost management.
One obvious approach to emphasize ownership cost would be for the JROC to encourage sponsors/users to designate lifecycle cost as a KPP; this is discussed in more detail below.
During pre-acquisition, sponsors or users set out to identify required capabilities and include them in the Capability Development Document (CDD). The most important attributes of the new system may be designated Key Performance Parameters (KPP).
According to persons interviewed, users or sponsors of programs have designated cost or sustainment as a KPP for several systems that have recently emerged from preacquisition into system development. The use of KPP to describe cost or sustainment is certainly not a practice that has been adopted universally; nevertheless, that such = =^Å èìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = -23-k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= Key Performance Parameters are stated at all suggests that leadership within the user community is showing interest in ownership cost and the desire to influence it.
The observation that cost and sustainment KPP are not used universally may reflect users' long held bias toward warfighting performance, whatever the price.
However, this observation might also reflect perceived additional risk from bringing attention to system lifecycle cost. It might also suggest that leaders in the user community lack confidence in the accuracy of lifecycle cost estimates, particularly as related to sustainment costs, which may be accrued far out in the future.
Leadership Emphasis on Control of Cost-Senior leaders and practitioners
interviewed generally agreed that significant pressure is being placed on programs to reduce cost. There was wide agreement that in pre-acquisition and early system development, leaders paid more attention to acquisition cost than to O&S cost. This has traditionally been the case and does not seem to have changed appreciably.
Acquisition cost, such as average unit procurement cost (AUPC) is more immediate and can be seen much more clearly than O&S costs that may accrue many years out into the future. There is a sense that O&S costs can be estimated more accurately after prototype testing and that prior to that time, O&S simply isn't accurate enough to support decision-making. The problem with that perception is that it suggests acceptance that early tradeoff decisions cannot effectively be influenced by CAIV 
D. Has the TOC focus been pushed aside by necessity?
A portion of the acquisition landscape post-9/11 includes expedited actions to support military forces engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. While this is only a small percentage of Defense acquisition, it is very visible and engenders emotional response.
Sec. 811. Rapid Acquisition Authority to Respond to Combat Emergencies 24 -This
law provides relief from applicable law and regulation in such cases where combat fatalities have occurred. Rapid acquisitions under this law are limited to $100,000,000 and two years. Whereas this law provides extraordinary relief in support of Armed Forces members in combat, there may be very significant associated logistics burdens and operating and support costs that result. This paper in no way argues that rapid acquisition is a wrong approach that should not be used. Rather, this paper acknowledges that there is a fresh rationale for avoiding TOC/CAIV consideration.
During the Cold War, the argument for ignoring TOC was that the United States was in a death struggle and that it was necessary to spend the required resources to = =^Å èìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = -25-k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= ensure our survival as a nation. Since 9/11, the earlier argument has resurfaced and "morphed" into the necessity for spending money to reduce combat fatalities. Using the armoring of Army and Marine Corps tactical vehicles (HMMWVs and trucks) as an example, significant funds have been expended applying armor protection to reduce troop fatalities. Few Americans would argue that up-armoring initiatives should be scrapped. However, at the same time, the DoD should recognize that there are will be sizeable logistics support costs due to increased stress on the frame, suspension, tires, and power train components of up-armored vehicles. The apparent lesson for the acquisition community is that when it comes to prevention of combat fatalities, questions of associated operating and support costs are moot.
Other Changes in Focus -Two major acquisition initiatives may increase pressure on TOC and possibly compete against CAIV during the "front-end" analysis of an emerging warfighting system.
The first is spiral development, which almost assuredly adds to logistics burden; this outcome results from proliferation of type, model, or series of equipment. The second is related to Performance-Based Logistics (PBL). That is, there is the possibility of analysis during the Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) determination-resulting in outsourced logistics that are virtually locked-in but are more expensive in some scenarios than alternative approaches. Both spiral development and PBL have potential effects on TOC that deserve further study.
Fact-of-Life Growth in Post Deployment Software Support (PDSS) -
2.
Has the DoD established the processes and tools to monitor and control CAIV?
Since 1999, the various DoD Components have designated Flagship or Pilot programs that would lead the way in development of tools, processes, and management actions to help control Total Ownership Cost. However, currently none of the pilot programs is in pre-acquisition. New programs that are in pre-acquisition need to be designated as R-TOC Pilots to increase the opportunity for lessons learned on application of CAIV.
Additionally, the DoD Components have OSMIS, AFTOC, and VAMOSC databases that, even if imperfect, can nevertheless be used to gain useful insights into O&S cost drivers. The DoD and defense contractors need to continue to refine cost databases and develop innovative cost models from which to better understand lifecycle cost impacts for legacy and future warfighting systems.
Has DoD leadership exhibited the resolve to control Total Ownership

Cost of warfighting systems?
Based only on anecdotal information, this writer is persuaded that the leadership backs away from insisting that warfighting programs address affordability. Lifecycle costs are not defined in terms of key performance parameters (KPP). Emerging programs in pre-acquisition are not required to establish lifecycle cost targets to guide CAIV analysis. Current guidance does not focus on total lifecycle affordability, but rather on the acquisition cost components and manpower only.
Has the DoD's Total Ownership Cost focus changed?
Since 9/11/2001, some of our priorities have changed as conditions in contingency areas have changed. The DoD has used rapid acquisition processes to be responsive to warfighters engaged in conflict. In some cases, total ownership cost has diminished in importance, particularly when our military members are being wounded and killed. This bias does not seem to have affected the longer-term developmental = =^Å èìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = -28-k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= programs at this juncture. However, increased O&S bills are already coming due and must be paid; Supplemental Authorizations notwithstanding, large O&S bills will compete with investment accounts for the same scarce resources.
Recommendation for further Study
Research should be conducted on the influence of spiral development, performance-based logistics, and post-deployment software support on lifecycle cost. 
